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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20000260-CA 
vs. 
STEVEN VALENCIA, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for retail theft, a third degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-602 (1999), in the Second Judicial District 
Court, Weber County, the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Substitute counsel. Did the court sufficiently inquire into defendant's 
expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel? Did defendant demonstrate that 
he was entitled to substitute counsel? 
This court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court's decision on 
"[wjhether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent defendant who expresses 
dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel, but who has no constitutional right 
to appointment of a different attorney." State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 
App. 1987). Failure to make inquiry into defendant's expressed dissatisfaction is 
error, but may be harmless. State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, |27, 984 P.2d 382. 
2. Forfeiture of right to counsel. Did defendant forfeit his right to counsel 
when, during preliminary proceedings on the day of trial, he twice called his 
appointed attorney "a piece of shit" and threatened to "spit on him or punch him"? 
Utah appellate courts have not addressed the forfeiture of counsel issue. 
Among the courts that have reviewed forfeiture rulings, some have reviewed for 
correctness, but others seem to have reviewed for clear error. Compare United 
States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 249 (3rd Cir. 1998) ("exercis[ing] plenary review 
over claims alleging denial of Sixth Amendment right to counsel"); United States v. 
Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1097 (3rd Cir. 1995) (reviewing de novo claim that trial 
court violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right when it forced him to proceed 
pro se) with United States v. Mcleod, 53 F.3d 322, 326 (11th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e 
cannot say that the district judge erred by concluding that [the defendant] had 
forfeited his right to counsel."); Watson v. State, 718 So.2d 253, 254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
2 
App. 1998) (holding that "trial court did not err by determining that [the defendant] 
had forfeited his right to counsel"). 
Although Utah courts have not addressed the standard of review applicable to 
the forfeiture of counsel issue, the Utah Supreme Court's discussion in State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), is instructive. Pena suggests the following 
standards: 
a. Whether a defendant can, under any circumstances, forfeit his right to 
counsel is a question of law, reviewable for correctness. See id. at 936. 
b. Further, whether a specific set of facts gives rise to a forfeiture is a 
determination of law, reviewable for correctness. See id. at 939. 
Whether a defendant can forfeit his right to counsel by threatening, 
abusive, and otherwise egregious behavior then is a question of law, 
reviewable for correctness. 
c. Factual questions, "such as things, events, actions, or conditions 
happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the subjective, such as 
state of mind," are reviewable for clear error. Id. at 935. Whether a 
defendant did in fact threaten counsel with physical injury or other 
abuse is clearly a question of fact, reviewable for clear error. Whether a 
defendant's behavior is sufficiently egregious to cause his counsel to 
fear for his safety or well-being is also a question of fact, reviewable for 
clear error. 
d. Some deference is appropriate when reviewing a trial judge's 
application of legal standards to a given set of facts. See id. at 939. 
Deference is appropriate where a trial judge "has observed 'facts,' such 
as [a defendant's] appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application 
of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to 
appellate courts." Id. Further, a trial judge is "in the best 
position . . . to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole." Id. at 936. 
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Pena suggests then that the issue here—whether defendant forfeited the right 
to counsel—is a mixed question of law and fact. It requires the application of a 
legal standard to a set of facts that cannot be "adequately reflected in the record." 
Id. at 939. Assuming this court finds that a defendant's threatening and abusive 
behavior can forfeit his right to counsel, deference should given to the trial court's 
perspective here on this defendant's demeanor, including his tone of voice and 
physical gestures. Some deference should be given to the trial court's determination 
that defendant's behavior foreclosed the possibility that defense counsel could 
continue to effectively represent him and that defendant thereby forfeited his right to 
counsel. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (1999) 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
Defendant was charged by information with retail theft, a third degree felony, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-602. R. 1. The charge stemmed from an 
incident on March 18, 1999, two days after defendant was released from prison. 
See R. 196:185. Defendant, discovering an open case in Aaron's Jewelry in Roy, 
4 
Utah, removed a diamond ring and handed it to his wife. R. 196: 68. They then 
left the store without paying for the ring. Id. 
Carol Yardley, a clerk in the store, observed defendant's furtive gestures and 
heard a ring case snap shut, but in accordance with store safety policies did not 
attempt to stop him. R. 196:60-62, 88. Immediately after defendant left the store, 
she checked the case and found the ring missing. R. 196:63. Surveillance tapes 
recorded defendant's theft. R. 196:63-64,67-71. 
Police detective Darren Calcutt interviewed defendant the following day. A 
videotape of that interview included defendant's admission that he took the ring. 
See State's Exhibit 6 (pertinent portions unofficially transcribed and attached in 
Addendum B). 
At his initial appearance, the court found defendant indigent and appointed 
Martin V. Gravis of the Weber County Public Defenders Association to represent 
him. Defendant sent two letters to the trial court prior to the preliminary hearing, 
complaining that his attorney was not representing him well and had not visited him 
in jail. R. 29, 30-32. Defendant requested that the court change his lawyer. R. 29. 
At a hearing on May 27, 1999, defendant asked permission to proceed pro se. 
R. 34. Defense counsel asked to withdraw because the defendant had not been 
cooperating. Id. The court did not rule on the request at that time. Defense 
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counsel also moved to dismiss the case because the State was not ready to proceed. 
Id. The motion to dismiss was denied. Id. 
The preliminary hearing was held June 3. During the hearing, defense 
counsel moved to invoke the exclusionary rule. R. 195:3. He successfully raised 
numerous objections during the State's examination of its witnesses, requested and 
received permission to voir dire the witnesses, and vigorously cross-examined them. 
See R. 195:6-8, 11, 14-15, 18, 23-25, 32-33, 40-46. 
Pre-trial conference was held on July 8. Defense counsel stated that 
defendant wanted to fire him. R. 194:2. The court then gave defendant an 
opportunity to explain his position. Id. 
Defendant stated that he felt that he had a conflict with the public defenders 
office. R. 194:2. He claimed that defense counsel had "violated the attorney/client 
privilege" at his last appearance in court, that he "said on the record some stuff that 
should not have been said in open court." Id. 
Defendant stated that he had written a letter, apparently about this allegation, 
to the Utah Bar Association and "[t]herefore there's a lawsuit pending against the 
public defender's office." R. 194:3. He requested "a different lawyer, a paid 
attorney," arguing that "there's a conflict of interest with the public defender's 
office because there's a lawsuit pending against them." Id. Defense counsel 
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responded that "[n]o lawsuit has been served and [defendant] didn't bring this up 
until I told him that the prosecutor wasn't willing to make a deal." Id. 
Defendant further complained that "this man was supposed to file motions 
which he has not filed. He is not doing his job. I asked him to file certain motions, 
[a] motion to bring forth physical evidence, a motion to suppress, a motion to 
dismiss, this man is not doing his job." R. 194:4. 
The court instructed defendant that an attorney is not obligated to file every 
motion a defendant may desire; rather, an attorney must review matters to determine 
whether a claim has merit and whether it is appropriate to file a motion. Id. He 
gave defendant a choice: "You can proceed to have Mr. Gravis represent you or you 
can proceed to represent yourself." Id. 
Defendant then declared, "This man has not talked to me one bit about the 
trial." R. 194:5. Defendant further asserted that he had a conflict of interest with 
defense counsel because "[t]he first time back in '91 he sent me down the river, 
that's why I am in prison." Id. The court suggested that defendant's own conduct 
might have sent him to prison, confirmed that trial would be held as scheduled, and 
told defendant, "Mr. Gravis will be here, you can make a determination at that time 
whether or not he's going to represent you." R. 194:6. The hearing concluded with 
defendant complaining about his rights and "this fucking state." Id. 
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On July 15 defense counsel moved to dismiss the case, arguing in his motion 
that the information was defective. R. 64-66. On July 22 defense counsel appeared 
in court to request a hearing on the motion to dismiss. R. 67. On July 27 defense 
counsel filed a motion for discovery because the state had entered into a plea 
agreement with defendant's wife and agreed to continue her sentencing until after 
she had testified against defendant. R. 68-70. 
On July 27 defense counsel also attended a hearing on the defense motion to 
dismiss. R. 85. When the motion was denied, he requested that trial be continued 
for sixty days to allow him to file an interlocutory appeal. Id. Defense counsel 
appeared on October 14 when trial was again continued because the appeal had not 
been adjudicated. R. 101. Defense counsel prepared the petition filed in connection 
with that appeal. R. 102-106. 
On January 24, 2000, the day of trial, defendant submitted a "Motion to 
Terminate Legal Counsel and Request for Conflict Counsel to be Appointed." 
R. 121-127. In his written motion, defendant reiterated his claim that defense 
counsel had failed to conduct "investigational research," to move for discovery, and 
to file other unspecified motions that "most likely would have gotten the charges 
dismissed at the preliminary stages." R. 122-123. 
He further argued that defense counsel had refused to call two witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing who could have shown that the state's witnesses were not 
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credible. Id. He stated that he was in the process of filing a bar complaint against 
Mr. Gravis and that he was planning "to file a bar complaint for conspiracy against 
the entire Weber County Attorneys office [including Mr. Gravis." R. 123-124. He 
also argued that defense counsel believed that he had "commit[t]ed the crimes he 
[was] charged with." R. 122. 
During trial proceedings prior to jury voir dire, the court permitted defendant 
to make an extensive statement in support of his motion that Mr. Gravis be removed 
and substitute counsel appointed. R. 196:3-6. Defendant alleged a conflict of 
interest and a complete breakdown in communications. R. 196:3. He stated that 
defense counsel had not spent sufficient time with him and had not made sufficient 
efforts to communicate. R. 196:3-6. He argued that defense counsel had not 
"thoroughly investigated the facts surrounding the charges nor possible defense[s]." 
R. 196:6 
The trial court then reviewed the record, observing defense counsel's earlier 
motion to dismiss and petition for an interlocutory appeal. The court attempted to 
ask defense counsel a question, but defendant interrupted again stating that he did 
not want defense counsel as his lawyer. R. 196:8. 
Defendant again alleged a lack of contact with his attorney, but retracted the 
allegation, at least in part: "I have not talked to Mr. Gravis since-well, I talked to 
him Thursday, okay." R. 196:9. He claimed that Mr. Gravis had been 
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"unprofessional and relay[ed] messages to me through the prison officials which 
was wrong." Id. He argued that he was not informed of the trial date soon enough 
to allow him to file his motion earlier. Id. He stated that the public defender's 
office wouldn't accept a collect call from him. Id. 
Defendant stated that he had a conflict with Mr. Gravis because Mr. Gravis 
had been excused from one of defendant's cases in 1995. Id. He also said that Mr. 
Gravis had been "one of the State's witnesses^] attorneys." R. 196:9-10. 
Mr. Gravis countered that he had accepted a collect call two weeks earlier and 
attempted to state the message. R. 196:10. Defendant interrupted before counsel 
could address defendant's claims about the call or defendant's allegations regarding 
the 1995 case or counsel's former representation of a witness for the State. 
Defendant called defense counsel "a piece of shit" and warned him, "Get out of my 
face." Id. Defense counsel moved to withdraw, stating that he would not represent 
defendant if defendant was going to call him names. Id. Defendant responded, 
"You are not going to represent me, that's the whole point." Id. 
Defendant then repeated his obscenity. Id. He continued to urge that he was 
entitled to another lawyer. The court responded, "I don't think that anyone is going 
to convince you any other way and we are going to proceed." R. 196:11. 
Defendant then stated, "[Then] I am going pro se." Id. The court responded, 
"Mr. Gravis is going to represent you." Id. Defendant then threatened, "No, he's 
10 
not. He's not going to represent me. If I have to spit on him or punch him, that's 
going to happen, cause I'm not going to let him represent me." Id. The court 
concluded, "Fine." Id. 
Defense counsel then added for the record that the message he relayed to the 
prison officials was "to get [defendant's] clothing sizes because I couldn't get him 
to the phone again so we could have clothes here for him to wear today." Id. 
Defendant continued to assert that defense counsel had acted inappropriately, stating 
"I never gave him permission to contact any prison guard in the prison to relay 
messages to me." Id. 
After further discussion of the clothing incident, the court asked defense 
counsel how he wanted to proceed. Defense counsel stated that he did not believe 
he could effectively represent defendant because of defendant's threats of violence 
and that he was unwilling to continue worried about defendant's "spitting 
on . . . and punching [him] during the trial." Id. 
Based on defendant's threats, the court allowed defense counsel to withdraw. 
He then explained the use of peremptory challenges to defendant, who responded 
"Fuck," complained that he did not know what was going on, and attempted to 
explain what he "did with Mr. Gravis." R. 196:13-15. 
The court explained that defendant had made his decision. R. 196:15. When 
defendant claimed that he had a right to an attorney, the court answered, "You 
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certainly do and you had one here ready to proceed." Id. To defendant's coiv.iued 
protests that defense counsel "wouldn't even file the motions for me," the court 
responded, "He's filed motions for you, motions have been heard. He's filed an 
appeal [of the interlocutory order] for you, it's gone up to the Court of Appeals." 
Id. No further colloquy ensued. 
While the court allowed defense counsel to withdraw and refused to appoint 
substitute counsel, the court repeatedly assisted the defendant with the presentation 
of his pro se defense. See R. 196:13-14 (explains peremptory challenges); 196:41 
(follows up on defendant's voir dire questioning of jury); 196:48 (reminds defendant 
of constitutional right not to testify); 196:40, 90-91 (secures attendance of two 
defense witnesses); 196:65-66 (helps defendant with scope of witness voir dire); 
196:69, 76 (explains use of cross-examination); 196:108 (observes that witness can 
be recalled during defense); 196:127 (clarifies that argument can be made during 
closing remarks). 
The State presented evidence that defendant committed the theft. Ms. Yardley 
testified to defendant's movements.at the ring case and to the snapping of a ring 
case. R. 196:60-62. Ms. Yardley and Police Officer Don Ponton testified that they 
viewed a surveillance videotape that showed defendant taking the ring. R. 196:68, 
96. The surveillance tape, though partially damaged, was played in open court. 
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R. 196:67. Defendant's estranged wife, Esmirelda Valencia, also testified that 
defendant took the ring. R. 196:113-115. 
Police detective Calcutt testified that he interviewed defendant about the 
incident on the following day and made a video recording of the interview. 
R. 196:146-147. That tape was also played in open court. R. 196:151. It included 
defendant's confession that he took the ring. See State's Exhibit 6 (pertinent 
portions unofficially transcribed and attached in Addendum B). 
The jury returned a guilty verdict. R. 196:192. Defendant timely appealed. 
R. 176. 
Martin Gravis submitted an affidavit, dated January 24, 2000, in which he 
memorialized certain facts associated with his representation of defendant. Mr. 
Gravis stated that he had reviewed the surveillance videotape with defendant and 
that their review suggested that Esmirelda took the ring. R. 170-71. He also stated 
that he and defendant had both seen the police videotape of defendant's admission 
that he took the ring. Id. He said that he was aware that Esmirelda had given a 
false name to the police and that she had agreed to testify against defendant in 
exchange for the State's affirmative recommendation that she not be sentenced to 
prison. Id. He concluded that his trial strategy had been to show that Esmirelda 
committed the theft and that defendant falsely admitted responsibility to protect her. 
Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Substitute counsel. The trial court sufficiently inquired into defendant's 
dissatisfaction with counsel, but defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for 
substitution. 
2. Forfeiture of right to counsel. Defendant forfeited his right to counsel 
when, in open court, he addressed counsel with obscenities and threatened to "spit 
on him or punch him." R. 196:10. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Defendant claims that the trial court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel when it permitted appointed counsel to withdraw at the beginning of the 
jury trial, but refused to either postpone the trial or appoint substitute counsel, 
thereby forcing defendant to try the case pro se. Br. Aplt. at 1. Specifically, 
defendant argues that the trial court did not sufficiently inquire into defendant's 
expressions of dissatisfaction with appointed counsel. Id. at 6. Further, defendant 
argues that the trial court failed to warn him of the dangers of self-representation. 
Id. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants the right to assistance of counsel. See State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 
187 (Utah 1987). An indigent defendant has the right to court-appointed counsel, 
14 
but not to counsel of his choice. See Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 272 (no "right to a 
lawyer other than the one appointed, absent good cause"); State v. Wulffenstein, 733 
P.2d 120 (Utah 1987) ("The right to counsel does not include the right of a 
defendant to designate his own court-appointed counsel . . . ."). The Sixth 
Amendment "also grants an accused the fundamental right to defend him- or herself 
in person." State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 808 (Utah 1999); see also Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20; Frampton, 111 P.2d at 187 & n.6. The right to 
assistance of counsel and the right to self-representation "must be construed in 
harmony with each other as far as possible." Bakalov, 979 P.2d at 808. A court 
may constitutionally require a defendant "to accept representation by competent 
counsel as already provided or represent himself." Id. at 809. 
An accused managing his own defense "relinquishes . . . many of the 
traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel." Faretta, 411 U.S. at 835. 
"Because a defendant's choice of self-representation often results in detrimental 
consequences to the defendant, a trial court must be vigilant to assure that the 
choice is freely and expressly made 'with eyes open.'" Bakalov, 979 P.2d at 809 
(quoting Faretta, 411 U.S. at 835). 
When a defendant elects to represent himself, "[i]t is the trial court's duty to 
determine whether [his] waiver of the right to counsel [is] knowing and intelligent," 
id. at 810, i.e., whether he "knowingly and intelligently forgo[es] those relinquished 
15 
benefits." Faretta, All U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Under most circumstances, a trial court should conduct a colloquy with the accused 
in which the court informs him of the dangers of self-representation "so that the 
record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with 
eyes open." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,918 (Utah 1998) (holding that absent a colloquy, the 
appellate court will review the record to determine the validity of a waiver "only in 
extraordinary circumstances"). 
But a defendant may forfeit, rather than waive, the right to counsel. When a 
defendant assaults his counsel or engages in other sufficiently egregious behavior, 
he forfeits the right to counsel. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 240 (3rd 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Mcleod, 53 F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Travers, 996 F. Supp. 6, 17 (S.D. Fla. 1998); State v. Carruthers, 2000 WL 
1824442, *15, *26 (Tenn. 2000); People v. Gilchrist, 658 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1997); W. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.3(c) & n.59 (2d ed. 
1999). Forfeiture is not an intentional relinquishment and therefore does not require 
a warning to inform defendant of risks associated with "the intentional 
relinquishment. . . of a known right." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
In the instant case, the trial court sufficiently inquired into defendant's 
dissatisfaction with appointed counsel. The court found no good cause for 
16 
defendant's dissatisfaction and therefore refused to appoint substitute counsel. The 
court appropriately determined that defendant would have to continue with 
appointed counsel or proceed pro se. 
Further, defendant here forfeited the right to continued representation when he 
threatened defense counsel. Defendant did not intentionally relinquish the right to 
counsel and needed no warning to insure that he acted intelligently. Moreover, 
defendant's actions foreclosed the possibility of a colloquy regarding the dangers of 
self-representation. By his conduct, defendant forfeited both the right to 
representation and the right to a colloquy. 
Point I 
Although the trial court sufficiently inquired into defendant's 
expressed dissatisfaction with counsel, defendant failed to 
demonstrate good cause for substitution. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his request for substitute 
counsel, claiming that the court failed to inquire adequately into the reasons for 
defendant's expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel. Rr Aplt. at 6. He 
details on appeal four grounds for his dissatisfaction: (1) counsel's alleged 
disclosure of confidential information in open court, (2) counsel's alleged failure to 
comply with defendant's requests, (3) counsel's alleged lack of consultation with 
defendant regarding trial, and (4) a conflict of interest based on an alleged 
breakdown of communication. Id, at 4-5. 
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Defendant has demonstrated no support in the record for his challenge. 
Although the court provided defendant more than one opportunity to explain his 
displeasure, defendant did not demonstrate good cause for his dissatisfaction or a 
legitimate basis for his refusal to cooperate with his attorney. See R. 194:2-6; 121-
27; 196:3-16. Further, even if a more detailed inquiry may have been useful, 
defendant—not the court—curtailed discussion. See R. 196:10-12. In any event, 
defendant's failure to show good cause rendered any error harmless. 
When a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, a trial 
court "must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature 
of the defendant's complaints." State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 
1987). The court must "apprise itself of the facts necessary to determine whether 
the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to 
the point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such extent that his or 
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be violated but for substitution." Id. 
Nevertheless, failure to inquire is harmless where defendant fails to show "good 
cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an 
irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict." Lovell, 1999 
UT 40, f31 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant must meet 
a "heavy burden" to successfully show "good cause." State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 
382 (Utah App. 1997). Where the attorney-client relationship deteriorates into 
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animosity because a defendant refuses to cooperate but the refusal has "no 
legitimate basis," the defendant is not deprived of the assistance of counsel and a 
trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying substitute counsel. Id. at 383. 
"Animosity may not be based solely on the defendant's illegitimate complaints or 
subjective perception of events." Id. at 382. 
Here, the trial court's inquiry into defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel was 
sufficient. The court asked defendant to explain his problems with defense counsel 
at the pretrial conference on July 8. Defendant then alleged that defense counsel 
had violated the attorney-client relationship by revealing privileged information in 
open court. SeeR. 194:2-3. Defendant also alleged a conflict of interest with 
counsel because defendant had filed a lawsuit against him. See R. 194:3. Finally, 
defendant argued that counsel had not filed motions "to bring forth physical 
evidence, . . . to suppress, . . . [and] to dismiss" that defendant had requested. 
R. 194:4. 
None of defendant's complaints at the pre-trial conference required 
substitution of counsel. Defendant detailed no revelation of privileged information 
below and has apparently abandoned this ground for his claim on appeal. See Br. 
Aplt. at 4-5. Further, contrary to defendant's claim below, a review of the record 
demonstrates no instance where defense counsel revealed privileged information 
during court proceedings. SeeR. 195. 
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Defendant has apparently also abandoned his claim of conflict based on his 
alleged lawsuit against defense counsel. See Br. Aplt. at 4-5. In any case, it 
appears unlikely that he had filed any lawsuit. See R. 194:3 Defendant alleged that 
a civil action had been filed against Mr. Gravis in 1993. Id. Even assuming that an 
action had been filed, defendant did not allege that he was a party to it. See id. 
Although defendant stated that he had written a letter to the Utah Bar Association, a 
grievance brought to the bar is not an action at law. See id. In any event, if 
litigation was pending or if a bar complaint had been filed, defendant himself 
initiated any proceedings and was therefore responsible for any conflict that might 
have resulted. Accordingly, the existence of these proceedings could not have 
constituted grounds for substitution. See Scales, 946 P.2d at 382 (determining that 
"the cause of the breakdown-or who is to 'blame'-in an attorney-client relationship 
significantly affects whether the breakdown constitutionally requires the court to 
substitute a defendant's court-appointed counsel"); see also W. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 11.4(b) & n.28. 
Finally, defense counsel had not failed to file appropriate motions. Counsel 
had made motions both to dismiss and to exclude evidence prior to the pretrial 
conference. R. 34; 195:3. While defense counsel had not filed a motion "to bring 
forth physical evidence," defendant did not specify, below or on appeal, what 
physical evidence he desired or how it would have affected his case. R. 194:4; see 
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also Br. Aplt. at 9-10. Moreover, the record demonstrates that both defendant and 
defense counsel had access to and had reviewed the two significant pieces of 
physical evidence in this case, i.e., the surveillance videotape and the confession 
videotape. SeeR. 170-71. 
On the day of trial, the court gave defendant further opportunity to explain his 
dissatisfaction with Mr. Gravis. Prior to jury voir dire, defendant submitted a 
written "Motion to Terminate Legal Counsel and Request for Conflict Counsel to be 
Appointed." R. 121-127. The court then heard defendant's extensive statement in 
support of this motion. R. 196:3-6. In his motion defendant reiterated some of his 
earlier allegations, including his contention that Mr. Gravis had not sufficiently 
communicated with him. SeeR. 122-124. He also argued that defense counsel 
refused to call two witnesses at the preliminary hearing who could have shown that 
the state's witnesses were not credible. R. 123. He stated that he was planning to 
file a conspiracy claim against the entire Weber County public defenders' office. R. 
123-24. He stated that Mr. Gravis had represented him in prior cases, that his 
representation was ineffective, and that the court had denied his request for removal 
of Mr. Gravis in an earlier matter. R. 123. 
The court then effectively denied his motion, stating that the case would be 
heard as scheduled. R. 196:9. Interrupting the court, defendant delivered a final 
barrage of complaints. He again asserted that defense counsel had not made 
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sufficient contact with him. He claimed for the first time that defense counsel had 
unprofessionally relayed messages to him through prison officials. Id. He also 
claimed for the first time that he had a conflict with defense counsel because 
defense counsel had been excused from one of his cases in 1995 and because 
defense counsel had once been an attorney for one of the State's witnesses. 
R. 196:9-10. 
When defense counsel attempted to explain his perspective on these 
allegations, defendant interrupted, addressing him with obscenities and threatening 
to spit at and punch him. R. 196:10. The court then asked defense counsel how he 
wanted to proceed. Defense counsel stated that he could not effectively represent 
defendant because of these threats and did not want to continue worrying about 
defendant's punching or spitting at him. The court permitted defense counsel to 
withdraw and required defendant to proceed pro se. 
Defendant did not demonstrate good cause for his dissatisfaction with defense 
counsel in either his "Motion to Terminate Legal Counsel" or in statements made 
prior to jury voir dire. Even had it been possible for defendant to demonstrate good 
cause during a more extended discussion, defendant's own behavior prevented any 
further discussion, and he cannot now claim that the court did not conduct a more 
extended investigation of his claims. Cf. Jennings, 855 F. Supp at 1444 (holding 
that defendant "waived" his right to counsel when he assaulted his court-appointed 
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attorney and that trial court was not responsible for failure to inquire into 
voluntariness following the assault). 
Defendant has apparently abandoned his claim that defense counsel should 
have called two additional witnesses at the preliminary hearing to impeach the 
credibility of the State's witnesses. See Br. Aplt. at 4-5. In any case, that claim, 
without more, is insufficient. Defense counsel almost never call witnesses at 
preliminary hearings. Defendant did not state what witnesses he might have called 
or what their testimony might have been or what difference it would have made. 
Presumably, defendant would have attempted to impeach the credibility of his 
estranged wife, a State's witness. Even had he impeached his wife's testimony at 
the preliminary hearing, the jewelry store clerk's testimony alone was sufficient to 
establish probable cause that defendant committed this crime. As defendant could 
have been bound over on her testimony, counsel's decision not to call other 
witnesses at the preliminary hearing did not harm defendant. Further, to the extent 
that defendant's witnesses could have raised a question about the credibility of any 
State's witness, defense counsel could have determined that their testimony would 
be useful at trial, but not at the preliminary hearing. See State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 
435, 438 ("[A] magistrate at a preliminary hearing is precluded from evaluating the 
weight of otherwise credible evidence."). 
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Defendant asserted that he had insufficient contact with defense counsel. 
Defense counsel's conduct of the case prior to trial, together with his affidavit 
submitted on January 24, demonstrates that contact was sufficient to enable him to 
vigorously represent defendant before trial and to prepare a reasonable strategy for 
presenting a defense to the jury. See R. 34; 64-70; 85-85; 101-106; 195:6-8, 11, 14-
15, 18, 23-25, 32-33, 40-46; 170-71. Defendant conceded that he had spoken with 
counsel. R. 196:4,9. Counsel's affidavit states that he viewed the surveillance 
videotape with the defendant. R. 170. While the record does not clearly indicate 
how much time defense counsel spent with defendant, the crucial question is not 
time, but adequate preparation. See Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 274 ("[Fjact that counsel 
met with the defendant only once before trial is not necessarily indicative of a lack 
of preparation."). 
Defendant claimed that counsel had unprofessionally relayed messages to him 
through prison staff. R 196:9. Again, defendant does not address this claim on 
appeal and has apparently abandoned it. See Br. Aplt. at 4-5. In any case, counsel 
had not relayed any confidential or even sensitive information through prison staff. 
Rather, when unable to reach defendant by phone, counsel had asked prison officials 
to get defendant's clothing sizes so that he could have clothing for him to wear at 
trial. R. 196:11. Counsel's contact with defendant through prison staff did not 
establish good cause for substitution of counsel. 
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Seconds before he began cursing and threatening, defendant threw out claims 
that defense counsel had been excused from one of his cases in 1995 and that 
defense counsel had once been an attorney for one of the State's witnesses. 
R. 196:9-10. Defendant did not give any further details at trial and makes no 
reference to these claims on appeal. Br. Aplt. at 9-10. Defendant has therefore 
abandoned these claims. 
Even assuming defendant's assertions were true and that he has not abandoned 
these claims, the mere fact that defense counsel was excused from one of 
defendant's cases four or five years earlier does not suggest that counsel could not 
or would not competently represent defendant in this case. 
No Utah precedent addresses defendant's claim that counsel's possible 
representation of a State's witness in some earlier proceeding gives rise to a conflict. 
Precedent in other jurisdictions is mixed.1 No jurisdiction, however, has held that 
1Compare, e.g., People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 1993) (holding defendant not 
prejudiced by his public defender's earlier representation of four prosecution witnesses), 
and People v. Enoch, 585 N.E.2d 115 (111. 1991) (stating that defense counsel's previous 
representation of State's main witness did not establish per se conflict of interest between 
counsel and defendant), with Brookes v. State, 686 So.2d 1285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) 
(determining conflict existed where defense counsel, whose motion to withdraw was 
denied, had previously represented confidential informant in case that led to defendant's 
arrest). For a more extensive compilation of precedent from other jurisdictions, see 
"Circumstances Giving Rise to Prejudicial Conflict of Interest Between Criminal 
Defendant and Defense Counsel—State Cases," 18 A.L.R. 4th 360 (Supp. 2000). 
Inquiries relevant to this issue include whether the earlier proceedings were related 
to the case at hand, whether defense counsel thoroughly examined the prosecution witness 
or whether counsel appeared inhibited by some loyalty to the former client, and whether 
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the suggested prior representation of an unnamed prosecution witness establishes a 
conflict of interest precluding effective representation. 
In sum, defendant has demonstrated no good cause for substitution. The trial 
court's inquiries were sufficient "to determine the nature of the defendant's 
complaints and to apprise itself of the facts necessary" to determine whether either 
sound discretion or the Sixth Amendment required substitution of counsel. 
Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 273. They did not. If the inquiries were insufficient, 
defendant-not the court-foreclosed further investigation. R. 196:10-11. In addition, 
the court need not address many of these complaints because they have been 
abandoned on appeal. See State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1307 n.2 (Utah 1986) 
(concluding that issues raised in a motion in limine but not included in the appellate 
brief were abandoned on appeal); Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 
P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 1991) (stating that failure to brief an issue on appeal 
waives point). 
Moreover, if error occurred, it was harmless. See Lovell, 984 P.2d at 390. 
Nothing in the record suggests that defendant had any legitimate basis for his refusal 
to cooperate with counsel or ugood cause" to support his request for substitute 
counsel. Id. at 388-90. Further, nothing in the record suggests that had a more 
extensive inquiry been conducted or had counsel been substituted, "the outcome 
defense counsel-who is usually in the best position to perceive a conflict-asked to 
withdraw because of a conflict of interest. See id. 
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would have been any better for [defendant]." Id. at 390. Given the facts of this 
crime and the evidence against defendant, nothing suggests that he could have 
prevailed at trial had substitute counsel conducted his defense. See id. at 389-90. 
Point II 
Defendant forfeited his right to counsel when, in open court, he addressed 
counsel with obscenities and threatened to "spit on him or punch him." 
Defendant claims that the trial court failed to adequately warn him of the 
dangers of self-representation. Br. Aplt. at 6. While defendant points to no 
precedent, it is clear that case law requires a warning to insure that any waiver of 
the right to counsel is made knowingly and intelligently. See Faretta, All U.S. at 
835; Frampton, 1?>1 P.2d at 187. However, defendant misconstrues his right to a 
warning under the facts of this case. Defendant did not waive his right to counsel 
by considered decision; rather, he forfeited his right to counsel when, in open court, 
he addressed his attorney with obscenities and threatened to punch and spit at him. 
Defendant did not intentionally relinquish his right to counsel. He therefore 
needed no warning to inform him of the risks associated with "the intentional 
relinquishment. . . of a known right." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
Rather, he forfeited the right when he assaulted his counsel. See W. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.3(c) & n.59 (2d ed. 1999). 
Utah courts have not yet determined under what circumstances a defendant 
may forfeit the right to counsel. But numerous courts, both in the federal system 
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and in other state jurisdictions, have addressed the issue. While they have employed 
mixed terminology—i.e., defendant "forfeited" his right, "waived it," or "waived it 
by his conduct"—they have clearly held that a defendant may lose his right to 
counsel by abusive conduct. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 240 (3rd 
Cir. 1998) (concluding that defendant who punched his attorney forfeited his right to 
counsel); United States v. Mcleod, 53 F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding 
determination that defendant had forfeited his right to counsel by verbal abuse, 
threatened harm, and threatened suit); United States v. Travers, 996 F. Supp. 6, 17 
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding defendant had forfeited right to court-appointed counsel 
after persistent abusive, threatening, and coercive dealings with two court-appointed 
attorneys and with five of six retained attorneys); United States v. Jennings, 855 F. 
Supp. 1427, 1445 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that indigent defendant who physically 
assaulted court-appointed counsel thereby "waived" the right to appointed counsel); 
State v. Carruthers, 2000 WL 1824442, *15, *26 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that 
defendant who threatened his third appointed counsel and accused him of lying and 
being on drugs forfeited the right to counsel); People v. Gilchrist, 658 N.Y.S.2d 269 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (defendant who brutally assaulted his attorney forfeited his 
right to counsel); cf. Watson v. State, 718 So.2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
(stating that trial court did not err in determining that defendant had forfeited his 
right to counsel following the withdrawal of six different court-appointed attorneys). 
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Defendant here sought to effect the removal of appointed counsel and the 
assignment of substitute counsel by threatening violence. A defendant who has used 
violence, or the threat of violence, "as a means of gaining a favorable ruling or 
other advantage in the course of litigation," should not be given the advantage 
sought. Jennings, 855 F. Supp. at 1444. When "violence is a part of a manipulation 
of the right to appointed counsel," a court should "simply [] deprive the defendant 
of that right." Id. Moreover, "[sjince the defendant has demonstrated that he 
cannot be trusted to respect the physical well-being of an attorney, no substitute 
counsel should be appointed, even assuming that there would be an attorney willing 
to accept the appointment." Id. Defendant thus forfeited his right to counsel. 
Further, the court had no obligation to inform defendant of the risks of self-
representation. The forfeiture of a right, unlike a waiver, need not be knowing and 
intelligent. A "forfeiture results in the loss of a right regardless of the defendant's 
knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish 
the right." United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3rd Cir. 1995) (stating 
that a defendant's dilatory tactics can amount to a forfeiture of his right to counsel 
and suggesting that threatening behavior can result in a forfeiture, but holding that 
determinations of fact made at ex parte hearing could not be used to justify 
forfeiture). See also Leggett, 162 F.3d at 250 (quoting Goldberg that forfeiture 
"results in the loss of a right regardless of defendant's knowledge thereof and 
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irrespective of whether defendant intended to relinquish the right"; Carruthers, 2000 
WL 1824442, *24 ("[Forfeiture results regardless of the defendant's intent to 
relinquish the right and irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the right. . . . 
[A] finding of forfeiture is appropriate even though the defendant was not warned of 
the potential consequences of his or her actions or the risks associated with self-
representation "); see also Jennings, 855 F. Supp. at 1444 (holding that lack of 
inquiry into whether "waiver" is knowing and intelligent is not the responsibility of 
the court when defendant's behavior determines the timing of the waiver); cf. United 
States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 642 (holding that defendant had knowingly and 
intentionally "waive[d]" his right to counsel even though he continued to ask for 
counsel because "defendant's actions [had] the effect of depriving himself of 
appointed counsel"); United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 19883) 
(stating that "a persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and 
appointment of new counsel . . . is the functional equivalent of a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of counsel"). 
Finally, even if the trial court should have conducted a colloquy, defendant's 
own acts prevented it. By his threatening and obscene behavior, defendant 
foreclosed further discussion of the representation issue. Because he alone is 
responsible for this behavior, he must bear the consequences of curtailing or 
preventing any otherwise appropriate court proceedings. Assuming he had a right to 
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warnings regarding the danger of self-representation, he forfeited that right as well 
as the right to counsel. See Jennings, 855 F. Supp at 1444 (observing that a trial 
court is unable to determine voluntariness when a defendant's "extreme and 
outrageous" conduct precedes or cuts off inquiry). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-602 
(7) "Retail value" means the merchant's stated or advertised price of the 
merchandise. 
(8) "Shopping cart" means those push carts of the types which are 
commonly provided by grocery stores, drug stores, or other mercantile 
establishments or markets for the use of the public in transporting 
commodities in stores and markets from the store to a place outside the 
store. 
(9) "Under-ring" means to cause the cash register or other sales record-
ing device to reflect less than the retail value of the merchandise. 
History* L. 1979, ch. 78, § 1; 1990, ch. 93, to this section was changed by the Office of 
§ 38; 1993, ch. 234, § 378; 1998, ch. 282, Legislative Research and General Counsel to 
« gg, reflect technical renumberings. 
amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- Cross-References. — Civil liability of ship-
ment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "Title after to merchant, §§ 78-11-14 to 78-11-16. 
53 Chapter 10, Peace Officer Classifications* 78-11-19. 
for -Section 77-la-r in Subsection (4). Detention of suspected shoplifter, arrest, civil 
Compilers Notes. - A n original chapter
 and c r i m i n a l i m m u n i t y , §§ 78-11-17, 78-11-18. 
reference appearing in the 1998 amendments 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative Sur- A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and effect of 
vey — 1979, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 155. statutes establishing shoplifting or its equiva-
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1980 lent as separate criminal offense, 64 A.L.R.4th 
Utah L. Rev. 649. 1088. 
76-6-602. Retail theft, acts constituting. 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be 
carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or 
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the intention of 
retaining such merchandise or with the intention of depriving the mer-
chant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise 
without paying the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag, marking, indicia of 
value or any other markings which aid in determining value of any 
merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale, in a retail mercan-
tile establishment and attempts to purchase such merchandise personally 
or in consort with another at less than the retail value with the intention 
of depriving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale 
in a retail mercantile establishment from the container in or on which 
such merchandise is displayed to any other container with the intention of 
depriving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the 
retail value of the merchandise; or 
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail mercantile 
establishment with the intent of depriving the merchant of the possession, 
use or benefit of such cart. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 78,1 2. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Unofficial transcript of videotape segment including defendant's confession on 
March 19,1999-from State's Exhibit 6, State v. Valencia, Second District Court 
Case # 991901063, received January 24, 2000 
[After the investigating detective read defendant his rights, he asked defendant, "Having 
that in mind, do you want to tell me what happened over at the store so that we can get 
that end cleaned up and ... I'll let you know what the county attorney says." Defendant 
made the following statement, with only occasional minor interruptions.] 
"We needed some money. My [or our] little girl's, you know, pretty sick We've 
been trying, you know, to get away from here, you know. My life's really in danger. 
Straight up, you know. 
"[Inaudible] seen the thing open . . . . [I] wanted a new life. I just grabbed it. My wife 
walked out with it. I put it in the book for her . . . . 
"I had no intentions [of taking anything] when I first went in. What happened is I had this 
gold chain in there. I was going to get it shortened. Esmi called me over. She said, 
'Look. It's open. We need the money.' I looked at it. I said,'No way.' She said,'We 
need money.' 
"I just grabbed it. I gave it to her. She walked out with i t . . . . Then I went back in. I 
wanted to give it back. Straight up. But then it was too late." 
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2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Valencia is present, 
4 this matter is set for trial on the 27th and 28th. 
5 Mr. Gravis? 
6 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, this matter has not been 
7 resolved. Mr. Valencia after we -- I had discussions with 
8 Ms. Beaton about resolution told me he wants me to fire 
9 myself. I informed him Ifm his attorney, that he does not 
10 have a right to pick and choose a public defender. 
11 THE DEPENDANT: Your Honor, during the last court 
12 sessions he violated the attorney/client privilege which is 
13 wrong. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Valencia, I want to hear from you 
15 but I want Mr. Gravis to complete what he said. 
16 THE DEPENDANT: Okay. All right. 
17 THE COURT: Okay? Go ahead, Mr. Gravis. 
18 MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor. Ifve informed him 
19 that if he wants me to -- does not want me to represent his 
20 % self that he would have to proceed pro se. 
21 THE COURT: Mr, Valencia, I'll hear from you. 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Your Honor, last time I was 
23 here in court there was argument if you could recall we was 
24 arguing in open court. This man said on record some stuff 
25 that should not have been said in open court, a privileged 
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attorney/client stuff. I've written a letter to the Utah 
Bar Association. In 1993, a civil action lawsuit has been 
filed against Martin Gravis for what he has done. The bar 
association is looking into him and they have investigating 
him. I was taken to Murray, Utah last Monday and was 
talking -- was talked by an investigator for several hours 
over the matter which happened here in Weber County where 
my -- the attorneys that are supposed to be helping me with 
my case are just basically trying to railroad me. Therefore 
there's a lawsuit pending against the public defender's 
office. 
THE COURT: What do you suggest, Mr. Valencia? 
THE DEPENDANT: I suggest and 1 isked the courts to 
grant me a different lawyer, a paid attorney or whatever 
because Ifm entitled to that. 
THE COURT: Well, you can pay an attorney if you --
THE DEFENDANT: T don't h*ve Hie money too. By law 
it states that if I don't have the money that the court is 
going to appoint me one because there's a conflict of 
interest with the public defender's office because there's a 
lawsuit pending against them. 
MR* GRAVIS: No lawsuit has been served and 
Mr. Valencia didn't bring this up until T told him that the 
prosecutor wasn't willing to make a deal. 
THE DEPENDANT: No, your: Honor, this is the whole 
thing. When we came and we did the prelim, okay, this man 
was supposed to file motions which he has not filed. He is 
not doing his job. I've asked him to file certain motions, 
motion to bring forth physical evidence, a motion to 
suppress, a motion to dismiss, this man is not doing his 
job. 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Valencia, Mr. Gravis is a 
well-respected attorney. 
THE DEFENDANT: He is -- this is the thing, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Will you stop for a minute? And just 
because you want some things filed or you feel like it 
should be filed, that's why we have attorneys so they can 
review to see whether or not there's any merit. Whether or 
not something is -- you think should be filed is appropriate 
to be filed, isn't necessarily the case. 
The Court has appointed an attorney to represent you, 
that's Mr. Gravis. Your options now are two: You can 
proceed to have Mr. Gravis represent you or you can proceed 
to represent yourself. Those are the two choices that you 
have. 
THE DEPENDANT: I can't get a different attorney? 
THE COURT: This trial is set for the 27th and 28th 
of July, that's in a couple of weeks. No other attorney is 
going to be prepared to take --
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I'm willing to have it 
postponed. 
THE COURT: I'm not willing to have it --
THE DEPENDANT: This man has not talked to me one 
bit about the trial. I'm down at the prison and we have not 
talked one bit about the trial. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE DEFENDANT: That's the whole thing. I!m not --
right here I'm not getting a fair trial. 
THE COURT: Mr Valencia, is it your decision --do 
you want to have Mr. Gravis to represent you or do you 
prefer representing yourself? 
THE DEPENDANT: I want a different attorney, is 
what I want. Because me and him have a conflict of 
interest The first time back in '91 he sent me down the 
river, that's why I'm in prison. 
THE COURT: Thank you. It may have had something 
to do with your conduct. 
THE DEFENDANT: No. No, it wasn't. 
THE COURT: Didn't have anything to do with your 
conduct? 
THE DEPENDANT: No I was respectful to the courts. 
Yeah, I am here to pay for what I have done. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that, you know, I 
1 mean, yeah. 
2 THE COURT: I will see you here on the 27th. We'll 
3 confirm the trial as going the 27th and 28th. Mr. Gravis 
4 will be here, you can make a determination at that time 
5 whether or not he's going to represent you or represent 
6 THE DEFENDANT: (unintelligible) boy all my rights. 
7 THE COURT: Thank you. 
8 THE DEPENDANT: (unintelligible) -- this fucking 
9 state, 
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1 January 24, 2000 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 
4 MR. VALENCIA: May I approach the thing? 
5 THE COURT: Just have a seat there for just a 
6 minute, if you would, please. Why don't you go ahead and 
7 call it. 
8 THE CLERK: State of Utah versus Steven Valencia, 
9 991901063/ this is time set for jury trial. 
L0 THE COURT: This is the time set for trial in this 
LI matter. The jury has -- the jury pool is here. We've had 
L2 them step back into rooms outside the courtroom. I 
L3 understand that there is a motion that is going to be made 
L4 at this time, Mr. Gravis? 
.5 MR. GRAVIS: It's being made by Mr. Valencia. 
.6 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Valencia, you may 
.7 proceed. 
8 MR. VALENCIA: This is the judge's copy. I still 
9 need to sign that, your Honor. This is the prosecuting 
0 attorney's copy. "Your Honor, defense is not prepared to 
1 proceed. There is an existing conflict of interest based on 
2 the total and complete breakdown of communication between 
3 defense counsel and myself. The defense in this case has 
4 not been prepared due to defense counsel's ineffective 
•5 assistance of counsel. Mr. Gravis has failed to contact me 
1 to discuss my legal right, nor has he attempted to prepare a 
2 any defense to my knowledge. Mr. Gravis and I have spoken 
3 for a total perhaps four or five minutes just prior to court 
4 hearings. During this time, Mr. Gravis and I have argued 
5 about Mr. Gravis1 reluctance to dedicate time for preparing 
6 my defense. 
7 "While speaking with Mr. Gravis briefly, I've expressed 
8 my concern about false evidence, possible witnesses and 
9 legal questions among other things essential to preparing my 
10 defense, Mr. Gravis stated that because of his large 
11 caseload and his opinion of my guilt, he may not have time 
12 to assist me, but did not state he would -- but he did state 
13 that he would dedicate some time to address these issues. 
14 Mr. Gravis has since failed to contact me at all. 
15 "Rule 8 of the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedures states, 
16 A defendant charged with a public offense --" 
17 THE REPORTER: Mr. Valencia, can you please slow 
18 down. 
19 MR. VALENCIA: "-- public offense has the right to 
20 self-representation, and if indigent, has a right to a court 
21 appointed counsel. If the defendant faces a substantial 
22 probability --" 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Valencia, this lady is taking 
24
 everything down so you need to slow down, if you will just a 
25
 little bit. 
5. 
MR. VALENCIA: All right. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. VALENCIA: "The substantial probability of 
depravation of liberty." Based on Mr. Gravis' performance, 
or lack thereof, a defense has not been prepared. Mr. 
Gravis -- Mr. Gravis1 mere presence in the court does not 
satisfy the requirement of effective assistance of counsel. 
The total and complete lack of communication, brief 
arguments and disagreements create existing conflicts. This 
conflict includes any meaningful defense preparations. 
"Chapter 13 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
under client/lawyer relationships states, "A conflict of 
interest exists when a lawyer's loyalty to a client is 
impaired when the lawyer cannot consider recommending or 
carrying out any appropriate -- any appropriate courses of 
actions for the client because of the lawyer's other 
responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect 
forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to 
the client. 
"Mr. Gravis1 failure to take reasonable steps to 
communicate with me by visits or mail and has not justified 
the performance prong in Strickland versus Washington where 
there was a strong presumption that counsel strategy and 
tactics fall within. The wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance, the prejudice prong can be equal 
£ 
applied because there is an actual or constructive denial of 
the assistance together when there are various kind of 
states interferences with counsel's assistance but when 
counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. The 
defiancies (sic) in Mr. Gravis performances are clear. 
Mr. Gravis has not thoroughly investigated the facts 
surrounding the charges nor possible defense. Mr. Gravis 
has failed to reasonably communicate with me, and therefore, 
has failed to prepare adequately for trial. I have not been 
advised of my rights or options available to me. 
"In summation, effective assistance of counsel is an 
essential jurisdiction and procedural prerequisite to the 
Court's authority to deprive the accused of his liberty. 
The absence of such effective assistance of counsel remains 
as a bar to the Court's jurisdiction and proceeds to 
validate -- proceed the 6th Amendment stance at the 
jurisdictional bar. If the requirements of the 6th 
Amendments are not complied with, the Court no longer has 
jurisdiction to proceed. Therefore, I request that this 
honorable court continue this matter and schedule it for a 
later date until competent counsel has been appointed and 
the defense is reasonably ready to proceed." 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Valencia, you may have 
a seat there. On July 8th of 1999 this case came on the --
or for pretrial. At that time there was a request made by 
2 
Mr. Valencia that the court appoint a private attorney to 
represent him with the expenses to be paid by the state. At 
that time, the Court informed Mr. Valencia that the Court 
would not appoint a private lawyer to represent him, that he 
had two options. Mr. Valencia, do you recall that hearing 
and that discussion? 
MR. VALENCIA: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: The discussion was that we would 
continue the case and allow Mr. Gravis to proceed with the 
case or the other option would be that you could proceed on 
your own. At that time, you informed the Court that you 
wanted Mr. Gravis to remain on the --
MR. VALENCIA: Your Honor, no, no, no. 
THE COURT: Just have a seat --
THE DEPENDANT: You told me --
THE COURT: -- for a second, if you will. You --
the Court informed you that it would be unwilling to appoint 
any other public defender tnat was no showing at that time. 
Then he -- I recognized at that time there was a problem and 
you were having some problem with Mr. Gravis in the 
discussions you were having. I think you had further 
discussions on that day, came back in and the Court 
determined that you could appear pro se, represent yourself 
pro se or that you could have Mr. Gravis represent you. You 
had said that you did not want to proceed for trial without-
1 the pro se or representing yourself. 
2 MR. VALENCIA: No, no. 
3 THE COURT: I'm looking at a minute entry. At that 
4 time the - - a t that time the jury was confirmed for July. 
5 There was then in July a motion to dismiss that was filed by 
6 Mr. Gravis. There's some issues as it related to discovery, 
7 there was also a petition for an interlocutory appeal that 
8 went up to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals sent 
9 the matter down. Mr. Gravis, do you want to be heard? 
0 MR. VALENCIA: I don't want him as my lawyer. He's 
1 not my lawyer. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Valencia, just have a seat there 
3 for a minute, please. 
4 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I'm prepared to proceed to 
5 trial. 
6 MR. VALENCIA: I don't want him. 
7 THE COURT: Thank you. Does the State want to be 
8 heard? 
.9 MR. VALENCIA: Can I speak? 
10 THE COURT: You are about the only one that has 
-1 been speaking so far, Mr. Valencia. Mr. Westmoreland? 
22 MR. WESTMORELAND: Judge, at this point it seems 
23
 I like this matter was heard, like you said, on the 8th of 
July. If the defendant doesn't want Mr. Gravis on, that's 24 
2 5
 fine, but the State is ready to proceed, been ready to 
a 
proceed. If he wants to do this pro se, thatfs fine but we 
are ready to proceed today. 
THE COURT: The Court has cleared its calendar to 
allow this case because it has been going on for some time 
to be heard this morning and it will be heard and we will go 
forward. Take a brief recess, the jury --
MR. VALENCIA: Your Honor, can I use this motion I 
have? I want it on record that I want to use them as a --
for appeal reasons in my appeal. And also, your Honor, you 
did you tell me, you told me that I had a choice and the 
only choice that I had was to go pro se. I have not talked 
to Mr. Gravis since -- well# I talked to him Thursday, okay? 
Then Mr. Gravis decides to be unprofessional and relay 
messages to me through the prison officials which was wrong. 
I never gave him any permission to relay any messages to me 
through prison officials. And I feel, your Honor, what's 
going on here, you know, is wrong. 
He never even contacted me and told me when trial was. 
I found out trial when trial was when I talked to him on the 
phone Thursday. If that would have been the case, I would 
have sent a motion earlier and would have done it. But the 
public defender's office won't even accept a collect call 
from me, you know. And also, your Honor, there is a 
conflict of interest in this because Mr. Gravis in '95 in 
front of Judge West was excused from one of my cases and 
JJL 
l also he's been one of the State's witnesses attorneys. 
I THE COURT; Thank you. 
3 MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, for the record, Mr. 
1 Valencia called me approximately two weeks ago collect and I 
5 took --
5 MR. VALENCIA: And also --
7 MR. GRAVIS: And the message --
8 MR. VALENCIA: You are just a piece of shit, is 
9 what you are. 
0 MR. GRAVIS: Okay. 
1 MR. VALENCIA: Get out of my face. 
2 MR. GRAVIS: At this time I move to withdraw. I 
3 don't have to put up with that. I'm not going to represent 
4 him if he's going to call me names. 
5 MR. VALENCIA: You are not going to represent me, 
6 that's the whole point. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Valencia, sit down. 
8 MR. VALENCIA: You are a piece of shit. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Valencia -- wait just a minute, Mr. 
50 Gravis. Mr. Valencia, don't say those words and don't --
-1 I THE DEPENDANT: Well, your Honor, I feel --
THE COURT: Stop. 22 
23
 I MR. VALENCIA: I feel everything that's happening 
24
 I in this courtroom is wrong. I'm entitled to a lawyer and 
25 I'm a lavman of t-Vio law *Y>A T ^««i*- ,,~^~ — -i J L. 
-LL 
proceed with this. 
THE COURT: Well, at this point I don't think that 
anyone is going to convince you any other way and we are 
going to proceed. 
MR. VALENCIA: Well, them I'm going pro se and I 
would like to be on record that the motion --
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis is going to represent you. 
j I MR. VALENCIA: No, he's not. He's not going to 
} represent me. If I have to spit on him or punch him, that's 
) going to happen, cause I'm not going to let him represent 
L me. 
2 THE COURT: Fine. 
3 MR. GRAVIS: And for the record, the message 
1 J relayed to the prison officials was to get Mr. Valencia's 
clothing sizes because I couldn't get him to the phone again 
so we could have clothes here for him to wear today. 
7 I THE COURT: So you are saying that the 
8 conversations he's relating to you was the conversation to 
9 get clothing? 
0 MR. GRAVIS: The one -- the message --
1 MR. VALENCIA: It still don't matter. It still 
!2 j don't matter, he's my attorney and I never gave him 
permission to contact any prison guard in the prison to 
relay messages to me. 




MR. VALENCIA: The day before he talked to me 
caseworker, why couldn't he do it the same way Friday? 
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis? 
MR* GRAVIS: I talked -- the only people I could 
talk to at the prison to find Mr. Valencia, after talking to 
the prison the night he was there, was the sergeant. I 
never talked to -- I never talked to his caseworker and the 
next day the sergeant wasn't able to get him to the phone so 
I got his sizes so we could have clothes. 
THE COURT: How do you want to proceed, Mr. Gravis? 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I'm not going to sit here 
and worry about somebody spitting on me and punching me 
during the trial. I feel that I cannot at this point in 
time effectively represent Mr. Valencia because he's made 
threats to commit violence on me. I'm not going to put up 
with that. I'm not going to represent him. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Based upon the threats that 
have been made this morning to Mr. Gravis, the Court will 
allow you to withdraw. You may withdraw from the case and 
you are excused, Mr. Gravis. 
MR. GRAVIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to ask the bailiff now if 
you'll bring the members of the jury in and we'll take a 
brief recess. If you'll bring the jury in, we'll pick the 
jury and we'll proceed. 
13. 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Judge, I guess the defendant and 
now -- I need to talk to you in chambers just quickly. 
Well, I guess we can do it now. There's a chance that --my 
wife is quite pregnant and there's a chance that -- she's 
started to have contractions last night, if I get paged I 
would like to be able to be excused. 
THE COURT: We'll deal with that when that comes 
along. 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Thank you. 
THE COURT: We'll take a brief recess and if you'll 
bring the members of the panel in. 
Let me just explain to you, Mr. Valencia, how we'll 
proceed. The Court will ask questions of each member of the 
potential panel of the jury. There will be eight jurors 
that will be picked. Once I've asked them questions, that 
will give you some idea, you then have four what's called 
peremptory challenges. Once the voir dire has been 
completed with the jury, I will hand a sheet -- the bailiff 
9 I will hand a sheet to Mr. Westmoreland, Mr. Westmoreland --
0 MR. VALENCIA: I ain't never seen nothing like this 
1 before in my life. 
2
 THE COURT: -- Mr. Westmoreland will then line 
;3 J out --
MR. VALENCIA: Fuck. 




initial. The paper then will be passed to you and you'll 
need to line out one person and then put your initial on it 
and that will go back and forth until each one of you have 
taken four people off the jury. 
After that's been completed, then all but those eight 
jurors will be excused. The Court will then give some 
preliminary instructions to the jury. After the Court has 
given those preliminary instructions to the jury, then each 
of you will be able to make any opening statement that you 
care to make to the jury. At the conclusion --
MR. VALENCIA: I don't know what's going on. I --
I -- I -- to be honest with you, this ain't going to be a 
fair trial 'cause I don't know what's going on. I've never 
had a jury trial and I don't know what's going on. And the 
reason, your Honor, I did what I did with Mr. Gravis is 
because --
THE COURT: Stop for a minute, Mr. Valencia. 
You've had all you are going to have to say about that 
situation. We're going to proceed. There are people that 
have been subpoenaed here that are sitting back there in 
rooms that are going to be brought out and a jury is going 
to be chosen and we are going to conduct the trial and 
that's going to happen now. If you want to pay attention to 
what I tell you, then that may be helpful. If you don't 
want --
IS 
MR, VALENCIA: Paying attention to what you tell me 
is going to be totally different because I don't know what's 
going on. I've never picked a jury. I've never defended 
myself in a criminal trial. I mean --
THE COURT: But you've made your decision this 
morning. 
MR. VALENCIA: I haven't made my decision. I've 
asked the Court for competent counsel or a different public 
defender besides him and you guys are denying me that. I 
have the right to an attorney. 
THE COURT: You certainly do and you had one here 
ready that was ready to proceed. The Court will be in --
MR. VALENCIA: But, your Honor, the thing is he 
wouldnft even file the motions for me. 
i THE COURT: Okay. He's filed motions for you, 
! motions have been heard. He's filed an appeal for you, it's 
' gone up to the Court of Appeals. 
J MR. VALENCIA: He never even sent me a copy of the 
J appeal. He never even -- he filed one motion, a 
3 interlocutory appeal, a motion to dismiss on the evidence. 
1
 THE COURT: We're going -- you might as well put 
2
 that aside for a minute because we're going --
MR. VALENCIA: Well, you're going to have a hard 
time convicting me because I'm going to make as much as 
whatever you want. I'm already in prison, your Honor, and 
what you a r e doing to me is wrong, it's willfully wrong and 
I don't know what's going on in this courtroom and since 
March 19th of '99 I've been railroaded and I would like to 
preserve these issues in my appeal. 
THE COURT: Well, you've definitely preserved them 
and your motion is in the file and your motion is part of 
the record, okay? The Court will be recess. Bring the jury 
in. 
(A brief recess was taken.) 
(Whereupon the jury enters the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen, for 
your patience this morning. We had some matters that we had 
to deal with prior to proceeding. By way of introduction, 
let me tell you my name is Parley Bald -- can't say my name 
this morning -- Parley Baldwin and I'll be acting as the 
judge this morning in the case. To my right is Debbie Wand 
who is the court clerk. It is her responsibility to put 
together the calendars, she is the one who makes all the 
minute entries. She will be in the courtroom all of the 
time that we are proceeding. 
I might say that while she's here, you may hear her 
working on the computer. She'll need to do that so we can 
keep track and keep going with the other cases that we have 
pending. So if you feel a little distraction, I apologize 
